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Carrots, Sticks, and Problem Drug Use: Law
Enforcement's Contribution to the Policy
Discourse on Drug Use and the Opioid Crisis
"Why complete drug treatment,if one can't go to prison?"
-Ohio Common Pleas Judges Association
TALEED EL-SABAWI*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the growing support for the idea that problem drug use should be
treated like a chronic medical disease, 1 some law enforcement interest groups,
including trial court judges associations, prosecuting attorneys associations, and
police associations ("law enforcement groups" or "criminal justice actors"),
continue to argue for the use of the criminal justice system to address the
*I would like to thank Sandra Tanenbaum for her mentorship, guidance, and unmatched feedback. Special thanks to the Drug Enforcement & Policy Center at The Ohio
State University's Moritz College of Law for providing me with funding and resources. A
heartfelt thank you to Leo Beletsky for giving his expert advice and mentorship. Thank you
to Doug Berman for his comments on early drafts and his insight on criminal justice reform
policy and politics, Alex Kreit for his review of early drafts and willingness to workshop
ideas, Micah Berman for his feedback on the many drafts of this Article, and Jennifer D.
Oliva for her thoughts on law enforcement groups. Finally, thank you to Charles Perkins for
his help with last minute research, Marissa Meredith for her insightful comments on later
drafts. Thank you to Emily B. Chatzky for her valued assistance in research and editing later
drafts.
1 See, e.g., Taleed El-Sabawi, Defining the Opioid Epidemic: Congress, Pressure
Groups, and Problem Definition, 48 U. MEM. L. REv. 1357, 1359 (2018).
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nation's drug crises. 2 The justification for the use of the criminal justice system
to oversee the psychological and medical treatment of persons with substance
use disorders (SUDs) is based on the belief that persons with SUDs are deviants,
who cannot refrain from engaging in sinful behavior. 3 Therefore, punishment,
or the threat thereof, is needed to deter the deviants' immoral conduct and to
ensure that the deviants comply with treatment. 4 Law enforcement groups have
also argued that incarceration is an effective method to "dry out" someone
suffering from a SUD, through a forced detox, thereby encouraging entry into
5
treatment.
The empirical evidence that supports the efficacy of coerced and
6
compulsory treatment is underwhelming, at best, and ineffective, at worst.
Furthermore, treatment outcomes for persons with SUDs enrolled in substance
abuse treatment without the threat of incarceration are equal to, if not superior
than, those under supervision of the criminal justice system. 7 Those entering
treatment through means independent of the criminal justice system have the
additional benefits of not suffering the stigma that results from a criminal

2 See, e.g., Prescription Drug and Heroin Abuse Issues Before the H. Energy and
Commerce Comm. and the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 114th Cong.
(2015) (statement of Victor Fitz, Cass County, Michigan Prosecutor & President,
Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/
IF02/20150326/103254/HHRG- 114-IF02-Wstate-FitzV-20150326.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2STG-49BF] [hereinafter PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues]; Press Release,
Statement from the Chambers of the Chief Justice, Maureen O'Connor, The Hidden Disaster
of State Issue 1 (Aug. 28, 2018), http://ohiopa.org/oconnor1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PMM2-MHLT]; Press Release, Statement from OSBA President Robin Weaver: Ohio State
Bar Association Opposes State Issue 1 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ohiobar.org/aboutus/media- center/osba-news/statements/statement -from-osba-president-robin-weaverohio- state -bar-association- opposes state -issue- 1/
[https://perma.cc/5EDJ-9HSM]
[hereinafter OSBA Statement]; Press Release, Statement of the Ohio Common Pleas Judges
Association regarding Ohio Issue One (Aug. 14, 2018), https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/depc/
wp-content/uploads/sites/ 115/2018/08/Ohio -Common- Pleas- Judges Associationmedia-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UQE-5X43]; State Issue 1: A Safe HarborforDrug
Traffickers

and

Violent

Offenders,

OHIO

PROSECUTING

ATT'YS

ASS'N

(2018),

http://ohiopa.org/noonl.html
[https://perma.cc/2KVV-XTEK]
[hereinafter
Safe
Harbor].
3
See generally EDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 3 7 (1965) (for an
overview of the historic use of the deviancy narrative and the purported justifications for its
use).

4 See generally Rebecca Tiger, Drug Courts and the Logic of Coerced Treatment, 26
Soc. F. 169 (2011).
5 See id. at 174 75; see also PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note
2.
6 Dan Werb et al., The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic
Review, 28 INT'L J. DRUG POL'Y 1, 7 8 (2016).
7 See id.
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record s and do not incur the additional taxpayer dollars spent paying for the
requisite law enforcement oversight. 9
Despite the empirical literature, some law enforcement groups continue to
make statements, underscored with assured certainty, that the threat of
incarceration is a necessary tool to treat SUDs and to address the nation's current
opioid crisis. 10 For example, in response to a 2018 Ohio Ballot Issue proposing
a decrease in criminal penalties for simple possession and reallocating dollars
saved to treatment services, 11 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio
wrote in the Supreme Court's official position statement,
Drug courts would be impeded by taking jail time off the table. We know,
through multiple studies, that drug courts are effective only when they combine
the "carrot" of treatment and support with the "stick" of judicial accountability,
including incarceration when needed. It is this carrot-and-stick approach that
enables judges and drug court teams to use a variety of tools to help people
overcome addiction. But Issue 1, while providing a lot of carrots by expanding
treatment, takes away the stick.... We are talking about Ohio becoming, in
effect, unable by its constitution to offer drug court participation and to
incentivize that involvement by the "carrot" of not having a felony conviction
record. Who would want to participate in a drug court program knowing that
they only face probation for possession of fentanyl, cocaine,
12
methamphetamine, K2, heroin, and so forth?

8 See Jordan Blair Woods, A Decade After Drug Decriminalization: What Can the
United States Learn from the PortugueseModel?, 15 U. D.C. L. REv. 1, 24 (2011).
9 KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN 249 (1994).
10

See, e.g., Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs' Ass'n, Sheriffs Blast Issue 1:

Irresponsible for Ohio (Sept. 19, 2018), http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?

DocGuid=389edd01-7fc2-43b -87 e-109a367905a0 [https://perma.cc/A73H-QZBL].
11 Amendment stated as follows:
If adopted, the amendment would... [in part] [m]andate that criminal offenses of
obtaining, possessing, or using any drug such as fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine,
cocaine, LSD, and other controlled substances cannot be classified as a felony, but only
a misdemeanor. Prohibit jail time as a sentence for obtaining, possessing, or using such
drugs until an individual's third offense within 24 months. Allow an individual
convicted of obtaining, possessing, or using any such drug prior to the effective date of
the amendment to ask a court to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor, regardless of
whether the individual has completed the sentence. Require any available funding,
based on projected savings, to be applied to state-administered rehabilitation programs
and crime victim funds. Require a graduated series of responses, such as community
service, drug treatment, or jail time, for minor, non-criminal probation violations.
Ohio Issue 1, Proposed Constitutional Amendment, "To Reduce Penalties for Crimes of
Obtaining, Possessing, and Using Illegal Drugs" (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sos.state
•oh.us/globalassets/ballotboard/2018/2018-1 lissue lcertifiedballotlanguage.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77RV-ZCBH].
12
O'Connor, supra note 2.
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Ohio's Chief Justice's narrative was echoed by statements from the Ohio
State Bar Association, 13 the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association, 14 the Ohio
16
Common Pleas Judges Association, 15 the Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio,
the Ohio Chief Probation Officers Association, 17 the Ohio Association of Chiefs
19
of Police,18 and the Buckeye State Sheriffs' Association.
Stances such as those by these law enforcement groups in Ohio are not
unique to state laws and politics; local prosecuting attorneys associations and
13 President Weaver stated as follows:
We firmly believe that treatment and rehabilitation are the right strategies for
curbing Ohio's opiate crisis and have seen them working in drug courts around the
state. However, when you categorically strip our judges of their discretion and take
away an important tool-the threat of prison time-you significantly lower the chances
that they will get sober, enroll in and complete a drug treatment program.
OSBA Statement, supra note 2.
14

Safe Harbor, supra note 2 ("Research and experience clearly demonstrate that

without court intervention, including possible incarceration, addicts are less likely to seek
treatment. The amendment will cost some addicts their lives.").
15Ohio Common Pleas Judges Association, supra note 2 ("Loved ones of drug
dependent individuals will lose their last chance to help their addict get clean in the criminal
justice system.").
16Gary Wolske, FOP of Ohio Opposes Issue 1, FRATERNAL ORD. POLICE OHIO (Sept.
24, 2018), https://www.fopohio.org/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view-article.cfm&
homelD=726163 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
17 Veronica M. Perry, OCPOA President stated:
I think we all agree that we have a health epidemic on our hands and treatment is more
appropriate than incarceration for individuals who suffer from [substance use
disorder] ... [however], the measure incorrectly assumes that there is an infrastructure
in place to handle the onslaught of people that would enter the court system.... This
approach not only minimizes a judge's ability to sanction after repeated offenses and
violations, but it seriously hinders a probation officer's effectiveness in compelling
treatment for individuals who may be lacking the motivation to seek help for
themselves.
Letter from Veronica M. Perry, President, Ohio Chief Prob. Officers Ass'n,
http://www.ohiojudges.org/Document.ashx?DocGuid=20a86127- 337e-40la-a194082eb2069273 [https://perma.cc/MV3U-98GF].
18
OACP named the following five ways in which it would impact Ohioans: (1)
undermine treatment efforts; (2) hinder the ability to prosecute drug traffickers; (3) reduce
sentences of violent offenders; (4) overburden local governments, and; (5) imply to young
individuals that drug abuse and addiction is not serious. Letter from Jeffrey Scott, President,
Ohio Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, OACP Issue 1 Opinion (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://oacp.org/oacp-issue-I-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/2SND-WND2]. OACP further
noted that the proposal would hinder the ways in which drug courts were providing
alternative treatment methods to individuals. Id.
19 See Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs' Ass'n, supra note 10 for a statement in
which the Buckeye State Sheriffs' Association emphasized the need for law enforcement to
get traffickers off the streets, noting that the proposed amendment would cost law
enforcement significant amounts of money, would fuel drug trafficking, and lead to many
more deaths in the community.
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other law enforcement agencies testifying at congressional hearings on the
opioid crisis have similarly argued for the need of the "stick" of incarceration to
address the opioid crisis. 20 Law enforcement groups' support for the stick is not
surprising in light of their historic efforts to support the use of punishment to
21
addressing problem drug use.
The use of the "carrots-and-sticks" narrative is part of law enforcement
groups' broader commitment to support a criminal justice approach to
addressing the nation's drug problem-an approach defined by the use of the
22
criminal justice system to deter bad behavior through the threat of punishment.
In my previous analysis of congressional hearing testimony preceding the
enactment of federal legislation to address the opioid crisis, I found that despite
the dominance of the idea that problem drug use is a public health issue, law
enforcement groups continued to emphasize the need for the use of the criminal
justice system to adequately address the opioid crisis. 23 This commitment to the
use of the criminal justice system has endured despite the international trend
24
shifting away from this approach as a means of addressing problem drug use.
The international community has widely acknowledged that a public health
approach incorporates best practices in substance abuse policy. 25 Although
evidence exists to suggest that the criminal justice approach to problem drug use
may be transforming, this evolution seems to only be occurring at the margins,
a phenomenon that I will discuss infra.
In this Article, I explore how public law enforcement groups 2 6 use
narratives to define problem drug use as a criminal justice issue in the wake of
the opioid crisis. In doing so, I explain the motivations behind law enforcement
groups' continued support for the criminal justice approach, despite the efforts
to redefine problem drug use as a health issue. Using theories of interest group
behavior, I argue that law enforcement groups' support of the criminal justice
approach is a result of their attempts to protect and further the interests of their
members, attorneys, judges, and police personnel who rely heavily on state and
20

See, e.g., PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2.

21 See Taleed El-Sabawi, The Role of Pressure Groups and Problem Definition in

Crafting Legislative Solutions to the Opioid Crisis, 11 NE. U.L. REv. 372, 374 (2019).
22
See id.

See generally El-Sabawi, supra note 1; El-Sabawi, supra note 21.
See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1358 59. See generally Policy and Practice
Briefings: Prisons and the Criminal Justice System, EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS &
DRUG ADDICTION, http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/print/best-practice/briefings/prisonsand-the -criminal -justice-system-en [https://perma.cc/7FCH-SXDH] (discussing health
intervention strategies in Europe).
23
24

25 See generally Policy and PracticeBriefings, supra note 24.
26

Inmy analysis of federal congressional hearing testimonies from 2014 2016 on the

opioid crisis, most, if not all, law enforcement interest groups participating publicly in the
discourse were public, not private, for-profit actors. Similarly, the position statements of law
enforcement groups on Ohio's Issue 1 came from public groups. Because public law
enforcement groups have been most active in the discourse, this Article focuses on the
contributions that these public agencies have made to the problem definition discourse in the
age of the opioid crisis.
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federal budget allocations for survival. I will demonstrate that narratives
supported by law enforcement groups in the discourse surrounding the opioid
crisis position these criminal justice actors as "fixers" 27 of the drug problem and,
in doing so, encourage the allocation of funding and resources necessary to carry
out their duties as problem fixers. I will further show how some law enforcement
groups have justified their continued roles as fixers of problem drug use, but
have done so on a spectrum, suggesting that at least some law enforcement
groups have acknowledged the need to re-envision their perceived role in
addressing problem drug use.
In Part II of this Article, I provide a short overview of the relevant literature
on pressure group behavior and narrative use in the policy process. In Part III of
this Article, I report the findings of my empirical analysis of law enforcement
groups' narratives defining the opioid crisis. Although the findings are based on
my analysis of the contemporary discourse, I also provide some historical
context to allow the reader to better understand the ways in which narrative use
has changed over time. In Part IV of this Article, I apply theories of interest
group behavior to explain how law enforcement groups have used criminal
justice themed narratives in the discourse on the opioid crisis to further the
interests of group members. In Part V, I review the variation between law
enforcement narrative use, focusing on the differences in the degree of law
enforcement jurisdiction and corresponding funding. I highlight that the
acceptance of the health-oriented approach is beginning to occur, but only at the
margins. I close with a call for research of proposed explanations for the noted
variations in law enforcement groups' acceptance of a health-oriented approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PressureGroup Behavior
In a pluralist majoritarian democracy, such as the United States, actors join
together in groups to protect the interests of their constituents. 28 These
organized interest groups lobby to further the interests of their members at each
stage of the legislative process. 29 Administrative agencies are also invested in
legislative outcomes that will increase or maintain their delegated powers, as
well as their operational budgets. 30 By engaging in lobbying efforts that include
providing legislative testimony or communicating directly with voters in an
effort to sway public opinion, 3 1 both administrative agencies and organized
27

DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 224

(3d ed.
2012).
28
29

See id. at 20 22.
See id. at 19 36.

30 See generally El-Sabawi, supra note 1 for an in-depth discussion of this contention.
See also MEIER, supra note 9, at 72 76 (discussing federal drug agency budgets).
31 Kevin M. Leyden, Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional

Hearings, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 431, 431 39 (1995); see, e.g., STONE, supra note 27, at 28
30.
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interest groups pressure legislators or voters to enact legislative proposals or
initiatives that support the interests of its group's members. 32 When doing so,
33
pressure groups commonly use a rhetorical tool known as the policy narrative.
B. Policy Narratives
Policy narratives, especially those describing the causes of a social problem,
are powerful rhetorical tools used by organized interest groups to persuade
policy actors to adopt preferred policy proposals. 34 As purveyors of information
and expertise, pressure groups are particularly well-situated to influence policy
by strategically crafting narratives 35 about what caused the policy problem and
who or what is to be blamed. 36 These policy stories classify certain actors as
either the "bad guys" 37 or the "fixers" 38 of the problem, create new political
alliances, and "either challenge or protect an existing social order. '39 Like
fictional narratives, these policy narratives have elements including characters,
a problem, and a solution.40 The process of crafting these narratives may be
conscious or unconscious, and the narrating group can start by choosing either
the characters, problem, or desired solution. 4 1 Narrators have leeway in
choosing the elements of their narrative and in choosing the order in which they
construct it, but all elements of the narrative must still be believable and credible
to the intended audience. 42 Although the elements of most policy narratives are
consistent, the order in which the story is crafted differs from narrator to
narrator, and the decisions the narrating group makes at each of these decision
43
points affects the alternatives available for the remaining story elements.
Consequently, policy narratives can narrow the available alternative policy
proposals in ways that limit possible proposals to those that are desirable,
32

See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 374 76.

Policy narratives are also referred to generally as narratives or stories. For the
purposes of this Article, I will not distinguish between the types of policy narratives, but
instead will use the term generally to refer to all types of stories used as forms of
communication
in the policy making process.
34
33

See, e.g., El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1362, 1367 n.48.
35 Some social narrative scholars also distinguish between stories and narratives. See,
e.g., SHAUL R. SHENHAV, ANALYZING SOCIAL NARRATIVES 20 36 (2015). For simplification
purposes, I will refer to narratives and stories interchangeably, with the caveat that there is
disagreement
in the literature as to the differences and similarities of the two constructs.
36
DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 148 54 (1988).
37
See, e.g., El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 388 89.
38
See STONE, supra note 27, at 157 82, 224.
39
Id. at 224.
40

See FRANK FISCHER,

REFRAMING PUBLIC POLICY: DISCURSIVE POLITICS AND

DELIBERATIVE PRACTICES 161-64 (2003); STONE, supra note 27, at 157 82.
41
42

See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380 85.
See FISCHER, supra note 40, at 177 78; see also El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1366. See

generally SHENHAV, supra note 35.
43

See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380 85; see also STONE, supra note 27, at 206 28
(discussing causal reasoning).
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ensuring that the narrating group's members benefit from the legislative
44
proposals and are protected from the burdens of regulation.
In the discourse surrounding problem drug use, law enforcement groups
have historically employed narratives that positioned the criminal justice system
as the best overseer of responses to problem drug use. 45 They have done so by
defining addiction as a deviant behavior and emphasizing punishment as a
deterrence for both drug use and drug sales.4 6 Although the traditional narrative
of deviancy remains a prominent feature of the law enforcement discourse,
variations of the deviancy narrative have surfaced as the federal legislative
discourse shifts from supporting a criminal justice approach to the opioid crisis
47
to a more health-oriented approach.

III. LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUPS' NARRATIVES DEFINING THE OPIOID
CRISIS

In my analysis 4 8 of federal congressional hearing testimony from 20142016, preceding the enactment of the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery
Act of 2016 (CARA), 49 and position statements by law enforcement groups in
44

See generally STONE, supra note 27.
See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1362, 1367 n.48, 1406 07.
461Id.
45

47

This is evidenced by the enactment of the following: Comprehensive Addiction and
Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA), Pub. L. No. 114-98, § 601, 130 Stat. 695, 732 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3(b)(2)(B) (2012)); SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, H.R.
6, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted); 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 34, 114th Cong. (2016)
(enacted).
48
To analyze the congressional hearing testimony, I used both qualitative and
quantitative text analysis. I used QDAMiner5 for the qualitative coding and Wordstat7 for
the quantitative analysis. I used content analysis methodology to create categories of causal
stories and proposed solutions. Once the categories were saturated, meaning causal stories I
identified fit into the categories created and no additional categories needed to be created, I
identified patterns and broader themes evidenced by the categories.
491 chose to analyze law enforcement groups' federal hearing testimony prior to
CARA's enactment because it is a sub-analysis of a much larger project on interest group
narratives on the opioid crisis. The corpus, or population, of documents for the parent project
were compiled by conducting a search on Thomas Reuters Westlaw for congressional
hearing testimony using the search terms "addict!" and "overdose!" and limiting the dates to
hearings occurring in January 2014 to June 2016. I chose to limit the analysis to hearings
occurring within these dates because it would capture the discourse that preceded CARA,
which was passed in June 2016. I restricted the dataset to 2014 because of resource
constraints. Future research will be needed to determine whether the findings of this Article
are time-limited. The terms "addict!" and "overdose!" were chosen because the purpose of
my analysis is to capture the discourse on the social problem commonly referred to as the
opioid crisis. The opioid crisis has been characterized by high rates of overdose and an
acknowledgment of the problem of addiction. I then excluded testimony, or parts of
testimony, that discussed methamphetamine use, synthetic drug use, and marijuana use, as
these problems were characterized differently than the opioid crisis, a difference I hope to
capture in a future analysis. The results were limited to hearings that occurred from 2014 to
2016. Both written and oral testimony were included. I then supplemented these narratives

CARROTS, STICKS, AND PROBLEM DRUG USE

2019]

Ohio on "Issue 1" of a 2018 ballot initiative, I identified four categories of
narratives that attempt to define the social problem of drug use, each of which
is outlined separately infra.
A. The Addict as the "Bad Guy"
The traditional narrative that explicitly portrays the addict as a deviant is
still supported by some law enforcement groups. 50 This narrative places the
blame on the person who uses illicit substances for fueling the drug trade and
for causing the crime that often accompanies black markets. 51 The individual
who uses illicit substances is the "bad guy" in need of punishment, or at least
the threat of incarceration, in order to deter his bad behavior. 52 Emphasis on the
drug users' association with the commission of crimes is often used to justify
the need to lock away this deviant in order to improve public safety and protect
the public from harm. 53 Some of these narratives explicitly challenge the idea
that addiction is an illness by arguing that the person is not ill but rather a
criminal. 54 In doing so, it supports the idea that addiction should not be used as
an excuse for criminal behavior. 55 The policy proposals accompanying this
narrative include increased criminal enforcement and the incarceration of the
deviant drug user. 56 While this narrative was by no means dominant in the law
enforcement narratives that I reviewed, it was epitomized by lengthy testimony
given by the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan when testifying in
front of Congress on the opioid crisis, excerpts of which follow:
Prosecutors, as indicated above recognize the need to hold persons
accountable for the wide variety of crimes they commit while using these
drugs. An addiction is not an excuse for criminal behavior. Incarceration is
often appropriate. Dealing with a criminal case involves far more than the
on federal legislation with position statements from law enforcement groups on Ohio's Issue
1, because (1) they provided a snapshot of narrative use on a state drug policy issue and (2)
they addressed an instance in which the initiatives' success would have resulted in a direct
power50(and money) transfer from the criminal justice system to the treatment system.
See sources cited supra note 2.
51
Drugs in Native Communities: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on IndianAffairs, 114th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Darren Cruzan, Director, Office of Justice Services, Bureau of
Indian Affairs), https://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/114/dangerousdrugs-033115 [https
://perma.cc/A6CA-B7UE] [hereinafter Drugs in Native Communities] ("The use of illicit
drugs can lead to impaired behavior that results in violence and other criminal behavior.
Drug traffickers often engage in violent crimes to facilitate their operations, while persons
with substance use disorders generally engage in property crimes to support their
addiction.").
52
PrescriptionDrug and HeroinAbuse Issues, supra note 2.
53 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1419.
54

Id.

55 In fact, most law enforcement groups that acknowledged the importance of health
responses still advocated for increased criminal enforcement alongside the health approach.
See, e.g.,
Press Release, Buckeye State Sheriffs' Ass'n, supra note 10.
56
See, e.g., PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2.
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individual defendant. It also includes public safety, sending a message of
deterrence to other offenders and the benefit that punishment also provides to
a wrongdoer, including but not limited to drug addicts. However, prosecutors
also recognize that if treatment can also be incorporated, the chance of
recidivism may well be reduced.
Surprising to some, rehabilitative and treatment providers often also see
the merit to the use of criminal prosecution to teach accountability and the
threat of incarceration as a real life, practical tool to get addicts to embrace
treatment, rehabilitation, etc.
Prosecutors, Defense attorneys and again, treatment providers also see the
benefit of periods of incarceration to bring sobriety and a "drying out" period
and a clear mind to drug offenders, including prescription and heroin
57
offenders.
Using the lens of interest group power politics, the addict-as-a-deviant
narrative names the law enforcement lobby as the primary "fixers" 58 of problem
drug use in the United States, as law enforcement agencies are experts in
punishment. As primary fixers, these groups are in a position of power, in part
because legislators consult with them when deciding how to address a social
problem. 59 During such consultations, these fixers are able to guide the
discourse to their preferred legislative proposals-those that increase criminal
enforcement and criminal penalties. 60 Fixers are considered to have the power
to describe the target population and the groups affected by the legislation and,
61
in doing so, can construct their deservingness for policy benefits or burdens.
Finally, as the primary fixers, they would likely be the recipients of the largest
share of federal and state budget allocation to address problem drug use, as those
62
fixing the problem need money to do so.
As much as the addict-as-a-deviant narrative may be preferred by law
enforcement, due in part to its depiction of law enforcement as the fixers, such
a narrative has fallen out of favor with other pressure groups lobbying on the
opioid crisis. 63 These groups have opted for more health-oriented narratives that
571Id.
58

See STONE, supra note 27, at 224.
59 Taleed El-Sabawi, What Motivates Legislators to Act: Problem Definition & the
Opioid Epidemic, A Case Study, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 189, 215 (2018).
60
1d. at 217.
61
See id. at 222 25.
621Id.
63

It appears, from my review of congressional hearing testimony preceding the

enactment of CARA, the deviancy narrative was not dominant in the discourse amongst law
enforcement groups' testimony. Though common historically, such explicit vilifications of
persons using illicit substance were outliers in the federal congressional hearing testimony
prior to the enactment of CARA. This finding does not mean that the addict -as-a-deviant
narrative is not the dominant discourse within the law enforcement community, but rather,
the law enforcement groups that were invited to testify before Congress on the opioid crisis
were primarily those that did not tell such a narrative with the same conviction as was done
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utilize health terminology, with some groups explicitly arguing that addiction is
a chronic disease of the brain. 64 If addiction is indeed a chronic disease that
changes brain chemistry, and not the result of inert deviance, the disease itself
is to blame for addictive behavior. 65 The addiction-as-a-disease narrative can be
interpreted as supporting a causal theory that directly disputes the addict-as-adeviant narrative. 66 The increasing popularity of this conflicting narrative may
have driven some law enforcement groups to adjust the deviancy narrative or to
develop an alternative narrative altogether. Based on my analysis, the three most
popular adjusted or alternative narratives include: (1) the carrots-and-sticks, (2)
the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys, and (3) law enforcement as active
participants in the health approach.
B. Carrotsand Sticks
The carrots-and-sticks narrative is a modification of the strict addict-as-adeviant narrative. 67 It combines the idea that those with an addiction need help
with the idea that they cannot be helped without the threat of punishment.68
The carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges that treatment may be
effective in addressing problem drug use, but because the addict has a
predilection for sinful or pleasurable behavior, punishment must be used as an
69
incentive to correct the bad behavior and ensure compliance with treatment.
This coerced-treatment narrative acknowledges the need for treatment, but
argues that due to the drug user's weak character, treatment adherence will only
previously. The composition of the law enforcement groups' testimony does indicate,
however, that the public tolerance for the addict -as-a-deviant narrative has decreased. This
statement is supported not just by the prominence of health-oriented narratives, but also, in
the types of stories the law enforcement groups that were selected to testify were telling. In
other words, it may not be that the law enforcement lobby has abandoned the deviancy
narrative, but that legislators invited law enforcement groups to testify that supported an
alternative narrative. See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 396 98.
64
See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380.
65
Addiction Science, NAT'L INST ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/rela
ted- topics/addiction -science [https://perma.cc/JJG7-SDT9] (last updated July 2015) ("In
reality, drug addiction is a complex disease, and quitting usually takes more than good
intentions or a strong will. Drugs change the brain in ways that make quitting hard, even for
those who want to.").
66
See El-Sabawi, supra note 1, at 1359 60.
67
1d. at 1388, 1406.
68 See, e.g., PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2 (quoting one
prosecutor who states they have been more successful in getting defendants into drug
treatment after the defendant has served jail time); O'Connor, supra note 2 (arguing "that
drug courts are effective only when they combine the 'carrot' of treatment and support with
the 'stick' of judicial accountability, including incarceration when needed"); Ohio Common
Pleas Judges Association, supra note 2 (arguing that the threat of prison is what "modif[ies]
a dependent defendant's thinking"); OSBA Statement, supra note 2 (arguing that treatment
is less likely and effective without "the threat of prison time"); Safe Harbor,supra note 2
(stating that "addicts are less likely to seek treatment" without the threat of prison).
69 See sources cited supra note 68.
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be achieved if the seduction of a high is combatted with the threat of
incarceration. 70 This narrative is predicated on the idea that the high of drug use
acts as a positive reinforcement for the drug-seeking behavior by assuming that
no other positive reinforcement will challenge that of the high. Consequently,
the only logical response is punishment, 71 like incarceration, or the use of
negative reinforcement, 72 such as releasing prisoners into treatment. The
73
underlying theory is that the carrotdoes not work without the stick.
Law enforcement groups that support this narrative argue that as enforcers
of punishment, they are in the best position to provide the punishment needed
to ensure compliance with drug treatment. For example, Nancy Parr, City of
Chesapeake, Virginia, Commonwealth's Attorney, shared an anecdote during
her testimony to demonstrate the effectiveness of carrots-and-sticks.
C.B. was arrested in 2006 and 2007 and, in 2007, was incarcerated for
violation of probation on an unauthorized use of a vehicle charge. At that time,
she requested and was allowed to enter our Drug Court program. She knew and
admitted that she was an addict, she had lost custody of her daughter and she
"dried out" in jail. C.B. needed help and the incarceration scared her and "woke
her up." She experienced a couple of setbacks in Drug Court but the immediate
sanctions reinforced the concept of consequences for all her actions and
choices. She successfully completed and graduated in 2009. She has been clean
since then, has regained custody of her daughter, and works full time. C.B.
stays in contact with my office and thanks me regularly for "locking her up for
74
60 days."
Specialized courts, called drug courts, offer an institutionalized mechanism
for these actors to supervise the process and ensure that persons suffering from
75
problem drug use complete their treatment.
Setting aside arguments about the merits of the carrots-and-sticks narrative,
the carrots-and-sticks narrative allows law enforcement actors to incorporate the
popular, "health-oriented 76 solution of treatment, but does so in a way that
ensures the use of the criminal justice system to oversee the treatment
70

71

ld.

Punishment is the addition of a negative stimuli. See generally Alan Baron & Mark

Galizio, The Distinction Between Positive and Negative Reinforcement: Use with Care, 29
BEHAV. ANALYST 141 (2006).
72 See generally id.
73

See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 2 (arguing that drug courts must retain the option to
punish
addicts
in order to be effective).
74
America's Growing Heroin Epidemic: Hearingon H.R. 953 Before the H. Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations, 114th Cong. 65 66 (2015)

(statement of Nancy G. Parr, Commonwealth's Attorney, City of Chesapeake, Virginia),
https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/114-45_95685
.pdf [https://perma.cc/68ZF-FMD4].
75 Tiger, supra note 4, at 171-73.
76 Throughout this Article, I use the term "health-oriented" to refer to solutions that are
interpreted by some as health solutions and not to effectively claim that a particular type of
solution is, indeed, a health solution.
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mechanism. 77 This concession allows for some drug policy funding to be
directed into the treatment system, but it also maintains a role for law
enforcement groups.78 The carrots-and- sticks narrative allows law enforcement
to address calls for increasing access to treatment but does so in a way that
makes most likely the continued flow of funding dollars into the criminal justice
system. Moreover, law enforcement groups maintain their role as enforcers of
legislation governing illicit drug possession and as overseers of the treatment
process. In sum, while the carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges the need
for treatment and "tosses a carrot" to the health advocates, it simultaneously
allows the law enforcement lobby to retain power and budget allocations.
While this narrative may be commonplace in the discourse on state drug
policy issues, 79 it was not prevalent in the congressional hearing testimony of
law enforcement groups on the opioid crisis between 2014 and 2016.80 The
narrative's popularity in Ohio's Issue 1 discourse may have been because of
Issue l's explicit mandate of the transfer of funds from the criminal justice
81
system to the treatment system as a means for addressing the opioid crisis.
Such a transfer of funds would conceivably be accompanied by a transfer of
power from the criminal justice system to the treatment system. The carrotsand-sticks narrative allowed for law enforcement actors to address the call for
treatment while maintaining the control and funding that Issue 1 sought to
redirect.
C. The Drug Traffickers as the Bad Guys
An alternative narrative that appeared with more frequency at the federal
level was the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys narrative. 82 Similar to the
carrots-and-sticks narrative, the drug-traffickers -as-the-bad-guys narrative
allows law enforcement to concede the benefits of treatment, while still
maintaining their roles as fixers. This narrative characterizes the drug
traffickers, instead of the drug users, as the bad guys-or the group to blame for
causing the nation's drug problems. 83 Within the federal congressional law
77

78

79

See O'Connor, supra note 2.
See id.

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 12.
See El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 380 94.
81 Ohio Issue 1, supra note 11; see sources cited supra note 2.
8

82

See, e.g., Community Solutions to Breaking the Cycle of Heroin and Opioid

Addiction: HearingBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of

Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney, District of Vermont), https://www.justice
.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2016/02/19/03 -17-14
usa coffin testimony-re-community-solutions to breaking-the-cycle of heroin a
nd-opioid-addiction web ready.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YVW-4NZA]
(discussing
"prosecuting traffickers who seek to profit out of selling this misery").
83

See, e.g., Community Solutions to Breaking the Cycle of Heroin and Opioid

Addiction, supra note 82, at 2 (statement of Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney,
District of Vermont) (describing a heroin user as a "treasured son" and the heroin dealer as
the villain responsible for the heroin user's death).

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 80:4

enforcement testimony, these drug traffickers were commonly described as
doctor dealers, 84 organized criminal enterprises, 85 or foreign drug cartels8 6 that
capitalize on persons struggling with addiction. By blaming these actors,
84

See Border Security and America's Heroin Epidemic: The Impact of the Trafficking
and Abuse of Heroin and PrescriptionOpioids in Wisconsin: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of Timothy
Westlake, M.D., Vice Chairman, State of Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, Chairman,
Controlled Substance Committee), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=810511 [https://
perma.cc/FLN4-YXWT] [hereinafter Wisconsin Heroin Epidemic] ("[T]here are the
prescribers that know what they are doing and intentionally profit from the prescribing I
see them as the 'doctor dealers.' . . . The 'doctor dealers' will and should be addressed by
law enforcement and state medical examining boards."); Opioid Use Among Seniors Issues
and Emerging Trends: Hearing Before S.Special Comm. on Aging, 114th Cong. 2 (2016)
(statement of Sean Cavanaugh, Deputy Administrator And Director, Center For Medicare,
Centers For Medicare & Medicaid Services), https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/SCACMSCavanaugh_2 24 16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LTR-NN9J] (discussing
how "pill mills" are a term that is used by law enforcement groups in order to "describe a
physician, clinic, or pharmacy that is prescribing or dispensing prescription opioids for nonmedical purposes, and where the prescription opioids are often diverted for sale on the illicit
market"); America's Heroin Epidemic at the Border: Local, State, and Federal Law
Enforcement Efforts to Combat Illicit Narcotic Trafficking: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Natalie Dawn
Mertz, Executive Director, Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, Office of National
Drug Control Policy), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=793249 [https://perma.cc/
92LY-G995] [hereinafter Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking] (discussing fraudulent
prescriptions, doctors, and pain clinics and the role they play in the opioid epidemic).
85 See Wisconsin Heroin Epidemic, supra note 84, at 5 6 (statement of James F. Bohn,
Executive Director Wisconsin High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (Wisconsin
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area), Office of National Drug Control Policy) (discussing
Chicago and Wisconsin organized crime syndicates); see also Examination of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy and Its Efforts to CoordinateDrug Policy Across the Federal
Government, 114th Cong. 2 (2015) (statement of David W. Kelley, Congressional Affairs
Liaison, National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Directors Association, Deputy
Director, New England High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area), https://republicansoversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Kelley-NEHIDTA- Statement- 12-1
-ONDCP.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5YU-EGL5] ("Drug trafficking organizations that prey
upon our communities and the criminal activity associated with them can be found in every
part of the United States.").
86
See, e.g., Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking, supra note 84 (statement of Bill
Montgomery, Attorney, Maricopa County); Examining the Growing Problems of
PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse: State and Local Perspectives: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
Cong. (statement of Corporal Michael Griffin, Special Investigations Division, Tulsa Police
Department), https ://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20150326/1 03254/HHRG-114
-IF02-Wstate-GriffinM-20150326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7KE-8EF9];
Posture
Statement Before H. Armed Servs. Comm., 113th Cong. 7 8 (2014) (statement of General
John F. Kelly, Commander, United States Southern Command, United States Marine Corps),
https://defenseinnovationmarketplace.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/SOUTH
COMMWstate-KellyUSMCJ-20140226.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BD6P- GUTG]
[hereinafter General Kelly Statement]; Heroin Addiction and Drug Trafficking, supra note
84 (statement of Mark J. Dannels, Sheriff, Cochise County, Arizona).
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narrators indicate that these actors are deserving of punishment-punishment
87
that should be carried out by increased or continued criminal enforcement.
In a variation of this narrative, some narrators explicitly differentiated
between drug traffickers and drug users, describing drug users as victims being
preyed upon by greedy drug traffickers. 88 For example, Gary Wolske, the
Faternal Order of Police Ohio's President stated, "[W]e must find a way to keep
the violent criminals and those selling drugs behind bars, while giving those in
the throes of addiction a path to better health." 89 To provide evidence of the
benefits of the ongoing enforcement, many of these narratives cited to statistics
and examples of cases in which law enforcement agencies intercepted large
90
quantities of drugs or prosecuted particularly nefarious drug dealers.
The drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys narrative was particularly useful to
federal law enforcement agencies, regional law enforcement coalitions, and law
enforcement agencies in localities that bordered Mexico. 9 1 These law
enforcement groups have jurisdiction over persons participating in the
importation of illicit drugs, and by portraying foreign drug actors as the villains,
they became the important fixers who could disrupt the networks of these
villains by intercepting large shipments of illicit substances. 92 These narratives
established the importance of border security, interdiction, and larger-scale drug
busts in addressing the opioid crisis. 93 And, they enabled these law enforcement

See sources cited infra notes 90 91.
88 Such a distinction is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence, as often those
87

who deal drugs also use them. See, e.g., Kathryn Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is
Also a Crackdown on Drug Users, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018), https://fivethirty
eight.com/features/a-crackdown-on-drug-dealers-is-also-a-crackdown-on-drug-users/
[https://perma.cc/R3DC-VYEX].
89
Wolske, supra note 16.
90 See, e.g., GeneralKelly Statement, supra note 86, at 3 7; HeroinAddiction and Drug

Trafficking, supra note 84. Historically, to demonstrate the need for continued funding of
the criminal justice approach to problem drug use, arrests of high -ranking members of drug
cartels or large seizures of illicit drugs, and not the lay drug user or dealer arrest, has been
used as a determinative a measure of success. See JOSEPH F. SPILLANE, Building a Drug
Control Regime, 1919 1930, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND

PRACTICE 25, 25 59 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) (discussing the
historic use of statistics by law enforcement to establish the need for continued criminal
enforcement).
91 See, e.g., General Kelly Statement, supra note 86, at 12 18; Wisconsin Heroin

Epidemic, supra note 84 (statement of R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner, U.S. Customs
and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), at 24.
92
93

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 91.
See The New Era in the Fight Against Methamphetamine in Iowa: HearingBefore S.

Judiciary Comm, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Corbin Payne, Lieutenant, Tri-County
Drug Enforcement Task Force, Waterloo, Iowa), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/10-13-15%20Payne%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TN8L- QYAJ];
Drugs in Native Communities, supra note 51 (statement of Andrew C. Hanson, Special
Agent, Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, State of Wyoming Attorney General).

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 80:4

groups to position themselves, alongside the health actors, as integral to solving
94
the opioid crisis.
In sum, the focus on the drug-traffickers-as-the-bad-guys and the narrative
distinction between the drug dealer and the drug user accomplishes certain
political objectives. First, it allows law enforcement groups to maintain the need
for the criminal enforcement that they provide. Second, it does so in a way that
does not challenge groups that characterize addiction as a disease or a health
problem. It obviates the need to directly contradict popular narratives of
addiction as a brain disease or a health issue, thereby avoiding a battle of
narratives with members of a politically powerful health industry that supports
these health narratives. Law enforcement groups could even partner with the
health narrative coalition, to address public safety, while health actors increase
access to needed substance abuse treatment. Reciprocally, if health-oriented
actors find this law enforcement narrative credible and believable, they can
support it without sacrificing their narrative. 95 Finally, by recasting the narrative
role of the bad guy from the drug user to the drug trafficker, these law
enforcement groups avoid seeming out of step with national trends in public
opinion, which show an increasing acceptance of the idea that addiction is a
brain disease as opposed to a moral failing. 96 By recasting the bad guy and
conceding the benefits and need for treatment, these law enforcement narrators
could accomplish their policy objectives, while potentially lowering political
costs.
D. Law Enforcement Groups as Active Participantsin the Health
Approach
Some law enforcement groups embraced the definition of problem drug use
as a health problem, citing to frustration of the tools of punishment at their
disposal and expressing the desire to help members of their community 97 in

94

Drugs in Native Communities, supra note 51.
95 See Legislative Proposalsto Combat Drug Abuse: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Robert

Corey Waller, M.D., M.S., Chair, Legislative Advocacy Committee, American Society of
Addiction Medicine); see also 21st Century Cures: Incorporating the PatientPerspective:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th
Cong. (2014) (statement of Richard F. Pops, Chief Executive Officer Alkermes, Inc.).
96j. Baxter Oliphant, PrescriptionDrug Abuse Increasingly Seen as a Major U.S.
Public Health Problem, PEw REs. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2017/1 1/15/prescription -drug- abuse -increasingly -seen- as- a-maj or-u- spublic -health-problem/ [https://perma.cc/N2PV-P27X] (finding that 76% of public
believes prescription drug abuse is a very or extremely serious public health problem in the
United
States).
97
America's Insatiable Demand for Drugs: Hearing Before S.Comm. on Homeland
Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 114-722 368 (2016) (statement of Frederick
Ryan, Chief of Police, Police Assisted Addiction Recovery Initiative (PAARI)),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=810472 [https://perma.cc/9V3E-8FQ5] ("Those
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ways that do not involve incarceration.9 8 These narrators often agreed that
addiction was a disease and that those suffering SUDs should be diverted away
from the criminal justice system and to health actors for treatment. 99 These law
enforcement groups commonly argued that they could not "arrest [their] way
out of the problem"10 0 and encouraged legislators to allocate more money for
101
treatment services.
However, rather than espousing a health-oriented approach that appointed
health actors as the only fixers, these law enforcement narrators created a role
for themselves within the health-oriented approach. For some, this role included
the provision of overdose reversal medication to overdose victims. 102 For others,
it involved delivering persons suffering from SUDs, not only to emergency
rooms, but also to points of entry into the treatment system, where the individual
could receive on-demand treatment. 10 3 Other groups argued that law
enforcement officials were best positioned to engage in prevention efforts,
10 4
specifically in preventing youth drug initiation through education efforts.

suffering from substance use disorders are not our enemies. They are our sons, our daughters,
[and] 9our
neighbors... [a]nd, this notion that we are at war with them must be abandoned.").
8
Id. at 370 ("The fact that law enforcement is recognizing this as a disease that needs
to be treated into remission, rather than a crime that requires arrest and incarceration, has
had a positive impact in communities throughout America.").
99
Frederick Ryan stated:
We, as law enforcement, cannot solve this problem alone-and we must stop
telling America that, with just some more resources, we can do so. In fact, a strategy
that relies largely on law enforcement and arrest, especially aimed at low-end users,
only fuels the epidemic and complicates the chances for long-term recovery.
Id. at 367.
100

See Jill Westmoreland Rose, Opinion, We Can't Arrest Our Way out of Growing

Opioid and Heroin Epidemic, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, https://www.charlotteobserver
.com/opinion/op-ed/article103032432.html [https://perma.cc/8LNU-SD2A]; see also,
e.g., America's Insatiable Demandfor Drugs, supra note 97, at 368 ("Every person with a
substance abuse problem that I have talked to has said that arrest and prosecution has never
been a deterrent.").
101 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93.
102
See, e.g., Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers:
Hearing Before S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Douglas C.
Throckmorton, M.D., Deputy Director, Regulatory Programs, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
congressional -testimony/deadly synthetic -drugs -need- stay- ahead-poison-peddlers
[https://perma.cc/RBC4-6CFG].
103
See Attacking America's Epidemic of Heroin and PrescriptionDrugAbuse: Hearing
Before S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (Statement of Enoch F. Willard, Chief
of Police, Manchester Police Department), https ://www.judiciary. senate. gov/imo/media/
doc/01-27-16%2OWillard%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ3G-YL4S] ("A 24hour continuum of care facility will be opening in the spring, which will allow 24-hour access
to care for anyone seeking treatment, while affording my department a more compassionate
alternative
to arrest.").
104
See, e.g., PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2.
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The narratives reviewed in this subsection share two characteristics: they
endorse the health approach and recast law enforcement actors as coordinators
of care or prevention specialists rather than enforcers of punishment. Despite
being most in alignment with the dominant health-oriented narrative, the lawenforcement-as-participants narrative was overshadowed by narratives calling
for increased criminal enforcement. 105
The lack of popularity of the law-enforcement-as-participants narrative
could be attributed to its potential effects on funding allocations. If law
enforcement actors become mere participants within the health actor's
approach, as opposed to the architects and enforcers of their own approach, then
they need fewer resources than previously needed for enforcement. The shift in
responsibility could call for transfers of both power and funding away from the
106
criminal justice system and to the health system to address problem drug use.
Such a shift, if enacted wholescale, would decrease the number of criminal
justice personnel or the resources available to the criminal justice system as a
whole. Such an outcome would not be in the best financial interest of law
enforcement actors and may explain the narrative's lack of frequency within the
discourse. Notwithstanding its infrequency, this narrative's mere presence in the
discourse is noteworthy because of the degree to which it departs from historic
107
law enforcement approaches to addressing problem drug use.
IV. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT NARRATIVE CONTINUUM
The narratives reviewed above differ in the degree to which they support
the dominant health-oriented approach to the opioid crisis, with some narratives
side-stepping the discussion, other narratives challenging the logic behind the
health-oriented approach, and others embracing the approach. These narratives
also vary in their depiction of persons with SUDs. Some narratives used by law
enforcement to define the opioid crisis adhere to the traditional portrayal of the
drug user as a deviant, 10 8 some shift the blame to the drug traffickers, 10 9 and
others challenge the portrayal of the drug user as a deviant, recasting him instead
as a person with an illness. 110 Despite these differences, and their social justice
implications, each of these narratives implicitly appoint the law enforcement
lobby as "fixers" of the drug problem-fixers who are deserving of resource
105

See, e.g., Deadly Synthetic Drugs: The Need to Stay Ahead of the Poison Peddlers,

supra note 102; The New Era in the FightAgainst Methamphetamine in Iowa: FieldHearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2015) 1 2 (testimony of Steven F.
Lukan, Director, Iowa Governor's Office of Drug Control Policy).
106
See Ohio Issue 1, supra note 11.
107 See generally David F. Musto, A Brief History of American Drug Control, 6 OAH
MAG. HIST. 12 (1991).

108 See, e.g., PrescriptionDrug and Heroin Abuse Issues, supra note 2 ("[S]ignificant
drug activity creates a generation of addicts who in turn sell drugs, steal property, rob and
as a result of drug altered states, assault and kill-other citizens as part of a vicious cycle.").
109 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 89 90.
110 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 93.
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allocations to carry out their duties. These narratives define problem drug use in
ways that increase the likelihood that law enforcement actors will be allocated
a share of the appropriations set aside to address the opioid crisis. These
narratives also refute the proposition that law enforcement groups are no longer
needed to address drug use-a proposition that threatens the survival of criminal
justice institutions by placing in jeopardy drug enforcement funding, which pays
111
for salaries and needed resources.
The law enforcement narratives defining the opioid crisis could be ranked
based on their effects on two primary factors: the degree to which the narrative
depicts law enforcement agents as fixers of the problem ("degree of
involvement") and the amount of federal monies that would be needed to fund
that particular degree of involvement. The ranking depicted in Figure 1, infra,
begins with the narrative that supports the greatest degree of involvement and
112
justifies the greatest degree of funding.
Figure 1: Relative Funding as a Function of Proposed Degree of Involvement
in Addressing Problem Use
Primary
Fixers

Incarcerate/
punish drug
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traffickers
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Treatment
only works
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The typology of law enforcement narratives depicted in Figure 1 suggests
that law enforcement groups envision their roles in addressing problem drug use
as evolving-with some law enforcement groups clinging to the idea that they

111 See generally Patrick Murphy, Keeping Score: The Frailties of the Federal Drug
Budget, RAND CoRP. (1994), https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue-papers/IP138/index
2.html [https://perma.cc/R7TE-YS2X] (explaining how drug enforcement budgets are
calculated).
112 The level of funding needed is not an estimate of the amount of funding that would
actually be needed. It is simply an ordinal ranking of predicted funding levels.
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are the primary fixers and others willing to take more secondary roles as active
actors within a health-oriented approach. Since budgets are often fixed and
resources are scarce, it stands to reason that the greater the role a group has in
fixing a problem, the greater allocation of resources they will receive. Based on
this logic, groups seeking to further their members' interests should,
hypothetically, prefer narratives that depict their group as the primary fixer of
the problem. As applied to problem drug use, this hypothesis would predict that
the addict-as-a-deviant narrative would be the narrative most frequently used.
However, I found that this narrative has fallen out of favor with law enforcement
groups weighing in on the opioid crisis. 113 I have yet to conduct an empirical
analysis of variables that influenced this evolution of law enforcement
narratives within drug policy, but the following theories may provide scholars
with a useful starting point.
It could be electorally costly for legislators to award benefits to groups that
are viewed as greedy, 114 or as sacrificing the public's interest for its members'
financial gain. 115 Therefore, for a narrative to motivate legislators to act, it
should demonstrate how the benefits, or funding, awarded will be used to further
the public's best interest. 116 The narrative should also resonate with and be
believable to its intended audience of legislators and voting constituents. 117 This
suggests that for law enforcement groups to be successful they must consider
widely held beliefs when deciding which amongst the available narratives to
support. In districts or states where the perceived public opinion supports the
explicit characterization of persons with SUDs as deviants, law enforcement
groups will be rewarded for using the addict-as-a-deviant narrative-the
narrative that awards law enforcement groups the greatest jurisdictional powers
(and benefits)-with little political costs.
Alternatively, for law enforcement groups concerned with the political
consequences of vilifying overdose victims that are the sons and daughters of
their voting constituents, the carrots-and-sticks narrative offers a suitable
alternative. The carrots-and-sticks narrative acknowledges that persons with
SUDs may be deserving of the opportunity to receive treatment, but also
reinforces the need for the criminal justice system to ensure treatment
adherence.1 18 Like the addict-as-a-deviant narrative, the carrots-and-sticks calls
for control, power, and funding dollars to remain within the criminal justice
system. Law enforcement groups that support this narrative may find that it
addresses the frustration of family members who are unable to force their loved
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one into treatment or who are unable to provide the familial support often
needed to ensure treatment placement and completion.
Law enforcement groups in districts or states where the idea that addictionas-a-disease is most accepted, however, may alienate voting constituents with
the addict-as-a-deviant narrative or the carrots-and-sticks narrative for the
reasons reviewed in the previous section. 119 For these law enforcement groups,
narratives that support the health-oriented approach, an approach aligned with
the accepted addiction-as-a-disease causal story, may better position the law
enforcement group and its elected or appointed leaders as allies to the public.
Elected officials of these law enforcement groups may decide that supporting
the health-oriented approach has electoral advantages and therefore be willing
to take these electoral benefits over the additional funding that would come with
a criminal justice approach.
At this point, however, the theories in this section lack empirical or
statistical proof. Each of the theories will need to be tested and additional
empirical work will need to be conducted to determine the degree to which
electoral considerations and shifts in public opinion influence the narratives
used by law enforcement groups.
V. CONCLUSION
Like other organized interest groups, law enforcement groups take part in
the problem definition discourse, during which they offer narratives that
represent a social problem in a manner that best furthers the interest of their
group members. For decades, the dominant narrative offered to Congress in
support of legislative proposals to address problem drug use depicted the drug
user as the deviant in need of punishment at the hands of law enforcement
agencies.1 20 Given the benefits afforded to law enforcement in accordance with
such a narrative, it is no surprise that some law enforcement groups preferred
narratives of deviancy when taking part of the discourse on the opioid crisis.
However, the legislative discourse has shifted, with both conservative and
liberal legislators shying away from the "fire and brimstone" stories of evil and
doom that once dominated the drug policy discourse. Their collective tone has
softened. As such, some law enforcement groups' continued and unwavering
commitment to the stories of the past appear antiquated and out of touch with
popular opinion. In localities that have been resistant to attempts to destigmatize addiction and drug use, such a stance may not cause elected law
enforcement officials to be concerned for their re-election. Conversely, these
officials may be rewarded, electorally and financially, by constituents that
continue to vilify drug users.
Despite the persistence of the addict-as-deviant narrative at the margins, a
majority of law enforcement groups that were active in the congressional public
discourse have abandoned the express vilification of persons with SUDs.
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Instead, some have embraced narratives that characterized drug traffickers as
the bad guy, while others have gone so far as creating a new role for law
enforcement actors within a more health-oriented response framework. This
evolution of narratives suggests that the criminal justice groups' traditional role
as the ultimate fixers of problem drug use is being redefined in the policy
discourse on the opioid crisis, at least by some law enforcement groups-despite
this redefinition requiring law enforcement groups to relinquish some of their
power over drug policy. Law enforcement groups willing to accept that such a
redefinition is inevitable have re-envisioned their roles strategically so as to
ensure that they are still fixers of sort. These groups redefined their own roles
in ways that protected their interests-even painted themselves as heroes-as
opposed to allowing other groups to relegate them as obsolete or to claim that
they are part of the problem. If the definition of problem drug use as a healthoriented issue is durable, then law enforcement groups that refuse to adjust their
narratives to account for the shifts in the discourse risk becoming a drug policy
anachronism, at best, or, at worst, as the new bad guys of the current drug policy
reform narrative.

